On March 22, 1992, USAir was preparing to take off from LaGuardia Airport in Newark bound for Cleveland, Ohio. The Fokker F28, registration N485US, had 47 passengers and four crew onboard. The flight had previously come in from Jacksonville, Florida, but was delayed by poor weather over New York. Another delay was caused by a passenger who decided to leave the aircraft in Jacksonville, meaning his baggage had to be retrieved from the hold. The aircraft was behind schedule by one hour and six minutes when it finally arrived at the gate.
The captain was Wallace J. Majure II, and the first officer was John Rachuba. The flight attendants were Deborah Andrews Taylor and Janice King. The crew were on the third day of a four-day sequence. Earlier that day, they left their hotel in Bristol, Tennessee, and drove to Charlotte, North Carolina, arriving at 11:40. They were then assigned a flight to Jacksonville, Florida, arriving at 15:50. It was due to leave at 16:35 but actually departed at 17:15.
Pre-flight preparations
The flight crew had disembarked the aircraft to use the facilities in the airport terminal. The weather had not improved on their return. The aircraft had been de-iced with type one fluid, a heated mix of half water and half glycol. To add further to the delays, one of the de-icing trucks had a mechanical issue and was blocking the aircraft’s path. After 20 minutes, the truck was finally removed, and the captain asked for a second de-icing, but the flight crew did not do a walk around. After the de-icing, ATC granted permission for flight 405 to taxi to runway 13 at 21:05.
The pre-flight checklist was completed during the taxi, and the engine anti-ice protection was switched on for both engines. The captain made an announcement to the passengers, telling them the flaps would remain up during the taxi. He placed an empty coffee cup on the flap handle to remind himself of the flaps position. He told the first officer to use the contaminated runway procedure with flaps at 18 degrees; take off would be with a reduced V and a speed of 110 knots/130mph. The flight attendants performed the safety briefing and secured the cabin ready for take-off.
Checking for ice
All of the taxiways were coated with snow, and on runway 13, there was wet thin snow that had been recently plowed and treated with urea and sand. The first officer noted that the snowfall was not heavy and was sliding off the aircraft. He checked for ice on the wings several times, but could not see any contamination, so they decided not to de-ice a third time and delay things further.
After the aircraft in front had taken off, the first officer said, “Look at all that stuff. What is it?” And the captain responded, “Sand, I guess. Urea and sand.” A nervous passenger had spoken to Janice about their concern about there being ice on the wings. She went to the cockpit and asked if there was any possibility of ice on the wings. Janice returned to the passenger, saying “Everything is OK, all is normal.”
Ready for take-off
Flight 405 was now several hours behind schedule, and there was heavy ground traffic, pushing taxi times to between 25 and 45 minutes. The flight attendants took their jump seats ready for take-off, Deborah at the front and Janice at the back. The flight crew started the take-off roll, and the first officer called out at 80 knots, followed by V and VR. Just over two seconds later, the nose gear left the ground, and all seemed normal.
The flight attendants noticed that the aircraft didn’t seem to be moving fast enough. A passenger said the aircraft shuddered. The first officer noticed that they were losing lift, and the captain tried to level out the wings. They held the nose up and the primary thought was to find somewhere safe to land. They used the rudder to maneuver the aircraft back towards the ground, avoiding the water.
Five seconds after take-off, the left wing scraped along the runway for 110ft. There were six stall warnings, and the aircraft banked left, then right, and then left again. It struck an ILS beacon and a water pump house, tearing the left wing and left engine off of the aircraft. There was a flash, a jolt, a rumbling along the ground, and then a sudden stop. The fuselage struck the edge of Flushing Bay and landed partially upside down in the water. There was no brace command from Deborah or Janice.
The aftermath
In the forward part of the cabin, passengers were hanging upside down from their seats. Some passengers were still in their seats in the water but submerged, the water above their heads. The passengers were confused and disorientated, and some drowned still in their seats. In their confusion, some could not free themselves from their seatbelt. There was a fire in the forward cabin and smaller fires on the water; there was thick black smoke. More than 200 rescue workers rushed to the scene and tried to rescue anyone still trapped in the cabin, pulling survivors out of the water.
Voices and screams came from those trapped in the cabin. Parts of the wreckage were in flames. Limbs were found floating in the water along with the bodies of those who had already drowned and floated to the surface. Some bodies were badly burned by fire. Two women were frozen to a piece of fuselage and had to be taken away, still attached to it.
The aircraft had crashed into Flushing Bay in poor weather at 21:35 local time. There were 24 survivors, of which 21 were injured. On that day, 27 people died, including the captain and flight attendant Janice. Of the 27, eight had minor injuries but died from drowning. Seven had serious injuries and died from drowning. Nine died from blunt force trauma; one died from burns and smoke inhalation. Another died from burns, and one survived but died at the hospital with cervical spine injuries. Some of the survivors had fractures, burns, bruises and cuts.
Shocked survivors escaped through holes in the fuselage and helped each other out of the water, some climbing up a ridge and sliding back down to the runway. Deborah and the first officer found a gap in the cabin floor near the jump seat and made their escape. She snaked her way out of the aircraft to be pulled ashore by a surviving passenger. Some passengers swam through the muddy water and scrambled to the shore. The tide was now an enemy, and the rescue team had to cease their efforts.
The cause of the accident
The NTSB said that the cause of the accident was pilot error along with inadequate de-icing at LaGuardia. There were lengthy delays during the taxi, and ice was on the wings and airframe. This disrupted the airflow, increased drag, reduced lift on take-off, and prevented the jet from lifting from the runway. The flight crew was unaware that there was so much ice on the wings. The aircraft also began the take-off rotation too early at a lower speed than the standard, which was a contributing factor.
There was a 35-minute delay on the ground, and the de-icing fluid was only effective for 15 minutes. The accident led to a number of studies on ice and aircraft and prevention techniques. There was also an error found on the safety card in that it did not show how to operate the galley service door or main boarding door in emergency mode. Although no exits were used in this accident, the safety board noticed that the safety cards were inaccurate and passengers needed to know how to open exits in an emergency. This, however, was not thought to contribute to the accident.
Sources: Accident Report, New York Times, The Washington Post, The Seattle Times, Bureau of Aircraft Accident Archives, Los Angeles Times
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